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Abstract
We analyze the sources of changes in the distribution of hourly wages in the
United States using CPS data for the survey years 1976 to 2016. We ac-
count for the selection bias from the employment decision by modeling the
distribution of annual hours of work and estimating a nonseparable model of
wages which uses a control function to account for selection. This allows the
inclusion of all individuals working positive hours and thus provides a fuller
description of the wage distribution. We decompose changes in the distribu-
tion of wages into composition, structural and selection effects. Composition
effects have increased wages at all quantiles but the patterns of change are
generally determined by the structural effects. Evidence of changes in the
selection effects only appear at the lower quantiles of the female wage distri-
bution. These various components combine to produce a substantial increase
in wage inequality.
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1 Introduction
The dramatic increase in earnings inequality in the United States is an intensely
studied phenomenon (see, for example, Katz and Murphy 1992, Murphy and Welch
1992, Juhn et al. 1993, Katz and Autor 1999, Lee 1999, Lemieux 2006, Autor et
al. 2008, Acemoglu and Autor 2011, Autor et al. 2016, and Murphy and Topel
2016). While this literature employs a variety of measures of earnings and inequality
and utilizes different data sets, there is general agreement that earnings inequality
has greatly increased since the early 1980s. As individual earnings reflect both
the number of hours worked and the average hourly wage rate, understanding the
determinants of each is important for uncovering the sources of earnings inequality.
This paper examines the sources of changes in the distribution of hourly real wage
rates in the United States for 1975 to 2015 while accounting for the drastic changes
in employment rates and average annual hours worked which occurred throughout
this period. To provide a fuller description of the evolution of wages we include all
individuals reporting positive annual hours rather than only those working full-time
or full-year.
Figure 1 recapitulates established empirical evidence on wage inequality by pre-
senting selected quantiles of male and female real hourly wage rates from the U.S.
Current Population Survey, or March CPS. The data are for the survey years 1976 to
2016, with information on average hourly wages for the calendar years 1975 to 2015,
and refer to individuals aged 24 to 65 years at the time of the survey, who worked
a positive number of hours the previous year, and were neither in the Armed Forces
nor self-employed.1 Consider first the median male wage rate. Despite a slight
increase between 1987 and 1990, the overall trend between 1976 and 1994 was neg-
ative, reaching a minimum of 17.6 percentage points below its initial level.2 It rises
between 1994 and 2002, but falls between 2007 and 2013. The decline between 1976
and 2016 is 13.6 percentage points. The female median wage, despite occasional
dips, increases by nearly 25 percentage points over the sample period. The male
1Section 2 provides a detailed discussion of the data employed in our analysis and our sample
selection process.
2 Throughout the paper we refer to the survey year rather than the year for which the data are
collected.
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wage profile at the 25th percentile shows the same cyclical behavior as the median
but a greater decline, especially between 1976 and 1994, resulting in a 2016 wage
18.2 percentage points below its 1976 level. In contrast, the female wage at the
25th percentile increases by about 17 percentage points. The profiles at the 10th
percentile are similar to those of the 25th and 50th.
At higher quantiles there is a small increase in the male real wage at the 75th
percentile over the sample period. However, until the late 1990s it remained below
its 1976 level before increasing throughout the last 15 years of our sample period.
The profile at the 90th percentile resembles that of the 75th percentile, although the
periods of growth have produced larger increases. For females, there has been strong
and steady growth at the 75th and 90th percentiles since 1980 with an increasing
gap between each and the median wage.
Figure 2 reports the time series behavior of the ratio of the 90th to the 10th
percentile, a commonly used summary measure of inequality. The figure confirms
the widening wage gap for both males and females with increases over the sample
period of 55 and 38 percent respectively. Rather than immediately focusing on
these ratios, we first identify the sources of the observed wage changes. The cyclical
behavior of the profiles in Figure 1 suggests that each responds to business cycle
forces, although the strength of the response varies by quantile. The behavior of
the various profiles also suggests that workers located at different points of the wage
distribution are subject to different labor market conditions.
The previous literature has emphasized two main sources of growth in wage
inequality. One is the increase in skill premia, especially the returns to education
(see for example, Juhn et al. 1993, Katz and Autor 1999, Welch 2000, Autor et
al. 2008, Acemoglu and Autor 2011, and Murphy and Topel 2016), but also the
returns to cognitive and noncognitive skills (Heckman, Stixrud and Urzua 2006).
The manner in which the prices of individual’s characteristics contribute to wages
is known as the “structural effect”. This also reflects other factors such as declining
minimum wages in real terms, the decrease in the union premium (see, for example,
DiNardo et al. 1996, Lee 1999, and Autor et al. 2016), and the increasing use of
noncompete clauses in employment contracts (Krueger and Posner 2018). The other
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source is the change in workers’ characteristics over the period considered. These
include the increase in educational attainment, the decrease in unionization rates,
and changes in the age structure of the workforce. The large increase in female labor
force participation may have also produced changes in the labor force composition.
The contribution to changes in the distribution of hourly wages attributable to these
observable characteristics is known as the “composition effect”.
Earlier papers (see, for example, Angrist et al. 2006, and Chernozhukov et al.
2013) estimated structural and composition effects under general conditions. How-
ever, they ignore the potential selection bias from the employment outcome (see
Heckman 1974, 1979). This “selection effect” is potentially important as the move-
ments in the employment rates and the average number of annual hours worked of
both males and females, shown in Figure 3, suggest that employment behavior has
undergone changes throughout our sample period. While this may partially reflect
long-run trends, it may also capture responses to cyclical factors. It is possible that
they are also associated with unobservable features of the workforce. Moreover, just
as the returns to observable characteristics may change over time, and be differ-
ent at different points of the wage distribution, the returns to these unobservables
may also vary. For example, Mulligan and Rubinstein (2008), hereafter MR, find
that selection by females into full-time employment played an important role in ex-
plaining the variation in inequality and that the selected sample of working females
became increasingly more productive in terms of unobservables during the last three
decades of the twentieth century. Moreover this contributed to a reduction in the
gender wage gap and an increase in wage inequality for females. Maasoumi and
Wang (2019), hereafter MW, support these findings.
MR employ a separable and parametric version of the Heckman (1979) selection
model (HSM) to evaluate the role of selection in changes in the conditional mean
wage of females. However, to evaluate the impact of selection at different points
of the wage distribution requires a nonseparable model. MW do so by employing
the procedure of Arellano and Bonhomme (2017), hereafter AB, which corrects for
sample selection in quantile regression models via a copula approach. Both MR and
MW analyze wages for the selected sample of full-time workers. This facilitates the
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use of the HSM and AB procedures, which are based on a binary selection rule.
However, as noted above, to obtain a fuller understanding of the evolution of real
wages it is important to examine the wages of all those working and account for
their hours of work decision. Figure 4 presents the fraction of workers who work
either full-time or full-year, with full-time defined as working at least 35 hours per
week and full-year as working at least 50 weeks per year. There is a large increase
in the fraction of full-time-full-year (FTFY) females, from 49 percent in 1976 to
69 percent in 2016, while the fraction of FTFY males increases only from 76 to
82 percent. However, while the fractions working full-time are increasing, there is a
substantial number of individuals who work less than full-time.
For males, the time series patterns of the wage percentiles of FTFY workers are
similar to those of all workers. This reflects that the sample of all workers is primarily
composed of FTFY workers. However, a closer examination of Figure 5 reveals some
notable difference across non-FTFY and FTFY males. At the 90th percentile the
two groups have similar wage levels and wage trends over the whole period. However,
for the 75th percentile and below the FTFY wages are clearly higher. There is a
large difference at the median, and the wage at the 5th percentile of the FTFY
group is higher for the whole period than that for the 25th percentile for the non-
FTFY group. For females, the FTFY wage levels and trends at different quantiles are
similar to those for all female workers. This is somewhat more surprising for females
given the lower proportion of female workers who are FTFY. Given this result it
is not surprising that the female FTFY wage distribution is similar to the female
non-FTFY distribution. In fact, there are instances of specific quantiles and time
periods when the females non-FTFY wage is higher than the female FTFY wage.
Similar to males, the larger relative differences in favor of the FTFY group appear
at the lower quantiles. Note that while we illustrate these differences by contrasting
these FTFY and non-FTFY categories there may exist alternative contrasts along
the annual hours distribution which would produce larger differences.
This evidence suggests the FTFY wage movements do not provide an accurate
representation of the evolution of wages for all workers. This is particularly impor-
tant when the individuals are non-FTFY due to spells of non-employment. This
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is likely to be the case for some of the time periods in our sample as indicated by
the patterns for males in Figure 4. Given that these workers are potentially more
vulnerable, which may be reflected in their wage, it seems inappropriate to exclude
them in an evaluation of wage inequality. It is also possible that wage differences
between these two working categories might capture selection effects in addition to
structural and composition effects. Moreover, the failure to include those who do not
work FTFY means that the selection effects in earlier studies may reflect movement
from the non-FTFY to FTFY, rather than from non-employment to FTFY.
To obtain a fuller picture of the wage distribution over a period of changing em-
ployment rates and changes in average annual hours worked, we feel it is appropriate
to include all workers and account for the selection of the hours of work decision.
Thus, a more general approach would allow for different selection effects at different
points of the hours distribution while incorporating varying structural and compo-
sitional effects. We incorporate these considerations by employing the estimation
strategy proposed by Ferna´ndez-Val, van Vuuren, and Vella (2019), hereafter FVV,
for nonseparable models with a censored selection rule. We estimate the relationship
between the individual’s hourly wage and their characteristics while accounting for
selection resulting from the individual’s location in the annual hours distribution.
The procedure employs distribution regression methods and accounts for sample se-
lection via an appropriately constructed control function. The estimator requires a
censored variable as the basis of the selection rule and this is provided by the num-
ber of annual working hours. The novelty of our paper is to decompose changes in
the wage distribution into structural, composition and selection via a model which
features a nonseparable structure and which also allows for selection into a wider
range of annual working hours. Each of these features appear to be empirically
important.
Our empirical results confirm previous findings, restricted to FTFY workers,
regarding movements in the wage distribution. Male real wages at the median or
below have decreased despite the increases in both skill premia and educational at-
tainments. The reduction primarily reflects the large wage decreases for those with
lower levels of education. Wages at the upper quantiles have increased drastically
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due to the increasing skill premium. These two trends combine to substantially
increase male wage inequality. Female wage growth at lower quantiles is modest
although the median wage has grown steadily. Gains at the upper quantiles are
substantial and also reflect increasing returns to schooling. These factors also have
produced a substantial increase in female wage inequality. Our results also provide
new evidence regarding the changing role of selection. These changes are especially
important at the lower end of the female wage distribution. Moreover, they tend
to decrease wage growth and increase wage inequality. Despite changes in the em-
ployment levels of males, both in participation and annual hours worked, there is no
evidence that changes in selection have affected the male wage distribution. This
result is somewhat surprising since some of the variation in male participation and
hours reflects ongoing phenomena in the macro economy.
The next section discusses the data. Section 3 describes our empirical model
and defines our decomposition exercise. This section also provides a comparison of
our decomposition approach with that associated with the HSM. Section 4 presents
the empirical results. Section 5 provides some additional discussion of the empirical
results, while Section 6 presents some extensions of the decomposition exercises.
Section 7 offers some concluding comments.
2 Data
We employ micro-level data from the Annual Social and Economic Supplement
(ASEC) of the Current Population Survey (CPS), or March CPS, for the 41 survey
years from 1976 to 2016 which report annual earnings for the previous calendar
year.3 The 1976 survey is the first for which information on weeks worked and usual
hours of work per week last year are available. To avoid issues related to retirement
and ongoing educational investment we restrict attention to those aged 24–65 years
in the survey year. This produces an overall sample of 1,794,466 males and 1,946,957
females, with an average annual sample size of 43,767 males and 47,487 females. The
annual sample sizes range from a minimum of 30,767 males and 33,924 females in
3 We downloaded the data from the IPUM-CPS website maintained by the Minnesota Popula-
tion Center at the University of Minnesota (Flood et al. 2015).
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1976 to a maximum of 55,039 males and 59,622 females in 2001.
Annual hours worked are defined as the product of weeks worked and usual
weekly hours of work last year. Most of those reporting zero hours respond that they
are not in the labor force (i.e., they report themselves as doing housework, unable to
work, at school, or retired) in the week of the March survey. We define hourly wages
as the ratio of reported annual labor earnings in the year before the survey, converted
to constant 2015 prices using the consumer price index for all urban consumers,
and annual hours worked. Hourly wages are unavailable for those not in the labor
force. For the Armed Forces, the self-employed, and unpaid family workers annual
earnings or annual hours tend to be poorly measured. Thus we exclude these groups
from our sample and focus on civilian dependent employees with positive hourly
wages and people out of the labor force last year. This restricted sample contains
1,551,796 males and 1,831,220 females (respectively 86.5 percent and 94.1 percent
of the original sample of people aged 24–65), with average annual sample sizes of
37,849 males and 44,664 females. The subsample of civilian dependent employees
with positive hourly wages contains 1,346,918 males and 1,276,125 females, with an
average annual sample size of 32,852 males and 31,125 females.
The March CPS differs from the Outgoing Rotation Groups of the CPS, or ORG
CPS, which contains information on hourly wages in the survey week for those paid
by the hour and on weekly earnings from the primary job during the survey week for
those not paid by the hour. Lemieux (2006) and Autor et al. (2008) argue that the
ORG CPS data are preferable because they provide a point-in-time wage measure
and workers paid by the hour (more than half of the U.S. workforce) may recall their
hourly wages better. However, there is no clear evidence regarding differences in the
relative reporting accuracy of hourly wages, weekly earnings and annual earnings.
In addition, many workers paid by the hour also work overtime, so their effective
hourly wage depends on the importance of overtime work and the wage differential
between straight time and overtime. Furthermore, the failure of the March CPS
to provide a point-in-time wage measure may be an advantage as it smooths out
intra-annual variations in hourly wages.
There are concerns with using earnings data from either of the CPS files. First,
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defining hourly wages as the ratio of earnings to hours worked may induce a “division
bias” (Borjas 1980). Second, CPS earnings data are subject to measurement issues,
including top-coding of earnings (Larrimore et al. 2008), mass points at zero and
at values corresponding to the legislated minimum wage (DiNardo et al. 1996),
item non-response (Meyer et al. 2015) related to extreme earnings values, earnings
response from proxies, and earnings imputation procedures (Lillard et al. 1986, and
Bollinger et al. 2019). Our use of distribution regression methods mitigates these
first two concerns. Since there is no consensus on how to best address the others,
we retain proxy responses and imputed values.
To explain the variation in hourly wage rates and annual hours of work we employ
the following conditioning variables; the individual’s age and categorical variables for
highest educational attainment (less than high-school, high-school graduate, some
college, and college or more), race (white and non white), region of residence (North-
East, South, Central, and West), and marital status (married with spouse present,
and not married or spouse not present). We also employ household composition
variables, including the number of household members and the number of children
in the household, and indicators for the presence of children under 5 years of age
and the presence of other unrelated individuals in the household.
3 Model and objects of interest
Our objective is to decompose the changes over time in individual hourly wage rates
at various points of the wage distribution into composition, structural and selection
effects. We do this by estimating a model for the observed distribution of wages
while accounting for selection and then estimating the objects of interest which
capture these three effects.
3.1 Model
We consider a version of the HSM where the censoring rule for the selection process
incorporates the information provided in the CPS on annual hours worked, rather
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than the binary employment/non-employment decision. The model has the form:
Y = g(X, ε), if H > 0, (1)
H = max {h∗(Z, η) , 0}, (2)
where Y is the logarithm of hourly wages, H is annual hours worked, X and Z are
vectors of observable conditioning variables, with X strictly contained in Z, g and
h∗ are unknown smooth functions, and ε and η are respectively a vector and a scalar
of potentially dependent unobservable variables with strictly increasing distribution
functions (DFs) Fε and Fη. We shall refer to max{h
∗, 0} as the selection rule. We
assume that ε and η are independent of Z in the total population, and that h∗ is
strictly increasing in its second argument. Equation (2) can be considered a reduced-
form representation for annual hours worked. The model is a nonparametric and
nonseparable version of the Tobit type-3 model (see, for example, Amemiya 1984,
Vella 1993, Honore´ et al. 1997, Chen 1997, and Lee and Vella 2006). The most
general treatment of this model, and best suited for our objectives, is provided by
FVV.4
Due to the potential dependence between ε and η, the assumption that Z is
independent of ε in the total population does not exclude their dependence in the
selected population with H > 0. FVV show that Z is independent of ε conditional
on V = FH|Z(H |Z) and H > 0, where FH|Z(h | z) = P(H ≤ h |Z = z) denotes the
conditional DF of H given Z = z, which implies that FH|Z(H |Z) is an appropriate
control function for the selected population.5 The intuition behind this result is that
V = Fη(η) under the conditions in FVV, so V can be interpreted as an index for
the error term in the hours equation. This control function can be estimated via a
distribution regression of H on all the variables in Z.
4This model could be estimated via the AB procedure although the FVV estimator is simpler
to implement in this context. However, as the AB procedure only requires a binary selection rule
it is more generally applicable than the FVV estimator.
5 This result is closely related to that of Imbens and Newey (2009), who consider estimation and
identification of a nonseparable model with a single continuous endogenous explanatory variable.
Their model, however, does not include a selection mechanism.
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3.2 Counterfactual distributions
We consider linear functionals of global objects of interest, including counterfactual
DFs, constructed by integrating local objects of interest with respect to different
joint distributions of the conditioning variables and the control function.6 Counter-
factual DFs enable the construction of wage decompositions and facilitate counter-
factual analyses similar to those in DiNardo et al. (1996), N˜opo (2008), Fortin et
al. (2011), and Chernozhukov et al. (2013). We focus on functionals for the selected
population. To simplify notation, we use the superscript s to denote conditioning
on H > 0. We also denote by 1(A) the indicator function of the event A.
Our decompositions are based on the following representation of the observed
DF of Y :7
GsY (y) =
∫
G(y, z, v) dF sZ,V (z, v),
where
G(y, z, v) = E[1 {g(x, ε) ≤ y} | V = v] (3)
denotes the local distribution structural function (LDSF):8
F sZ,V (z, v) =
1{h(z, v) > 0}FZ,V (z, v)∫
1{h(z, v) > 0} dFZ,V (z, v)
denotes the joint DF of Z and V in the selected population, h(z, v) = h∗(z, F−1η (v)),
and FZ,V (z, v) denotes the joint DF of Z and V in the total population.
Our counterfactual DFs are constructed by combining the DFs G and FZ,V with
the selection rule (2) for different groups, each group corresponding to a different
time period or a subpopulation defined by certain characteristics. Specifically, let Gt
denote the LDSF in group t, let FZk,Vk denote the joint DF of Z and V in group k,
and let max{hr, 0} denote the selection rule in group r. The counterfactual DF of Y
when G is as in group t, FZ,V is as in group k, and the selection rule is as in group r
6We use the term local object to refer to indicate it is conditional on a given value of V.
7 We refer to FVV for details
8 The LDSF gives the DF of wages if all individuals with control function equal to v had
observable characteristics equal to x.
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is defined as:
GsY〈t,k,r〉(y) =
∫
Gt(y, x, v) 1{hr(z, v) > 0} dFZk,Vk(z, v)∫
1{hr(z, v) > 0} dFZk,Vk(z, v)
. (4)
Since the mapping v 7→ h(z, v) is monotonic, the condition hr(z, v) > 0 in (4) is
equivalent to the condition:
v > FHr |Z(0 | z), (5)
where FHr |Z(0 | z) is the probability of working zero annual hours conditional on
Z = z in group r. Given GsY〈t,k,r〉(y), the counterfactual quantile function (QF) of Y
when G is as in group t, FZ,V is as in group k, and the selection rule is as in group r
is defined as:
qsY〈t,k,r〉(τ) = inf{y ∈ R : G
s
Y〈t,k,r〉
(y) ≥ τ}, 0 < τ < 1, (6)
Under these definitions, the observed DF and QF of Y for the selected population
in group t are GsY〈t,t,t〉 and q
s
Y〈t,t,t〉
respectively. FVV show that (4) and (6) are
nonparametrically identified if Zk ⊆ Zr and (XVk ∩ZVr) ⊆ ZV t, where Zk denotes
the support of Z in group k, ZVk denotes the support of Z for the selected population
in group k, namely the set of possible combinations of observable characteristics Z
and values of the control function V for the individuals in group k working a positive
number of annual hours, etc.9
Using (6), we can decompose the difference in the observed QF of Y for the
selected population between any two groups, say group 1 and group 0, as:
qsY〈1,1,1〉 − q
s
Y〈0,0,0〉
= [qsY〈1,1,1〉 − q
s
Y〈1,1,0〉
]︸ ︷︷ ︸
[1]
+ [qsY〈1,1,0〉 − q
s
Y〈1,0,0〉
]︸ ︷︷ ︸
[2]
+ [qsY〈1,0,0〉 − q
s
Y〈0,0,0〉
]︸ ︷︷ ︸
[3]
, (7)
where [1] is a selection effect that reflects changes in the selection rule given the
joint distribution of the conditioning variables and the control function, [2] is a
composition effect that reflects changes in the joint distribution of the conditioning
variables and the control function, and [3] is a structural effect that reflects changes
9 These conditions are weaker than requiring ZVk ⊆ ZVr and ZVk ⊆ ZVt, which guarantees
that hr and Gt are identified for all combinations of z and v over which we integrate.
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in the conditional distribution of the outcome given the conditioning variables and
the control function.
3.3 Comparison with the Heckman selection model
When applied to changes over time in the DF of hourly wages, the decomposition (7)
yields effects that are defined differently from those derived by MR for a parametric
version of the HSM. More precisely, the selection effect in MR excludes a compo-
nent that we attribute to the selection effect, includes another that we attribute
to the composition effect, and contains one that in nonseparable models cannot be
separately identified from the structural effect.
To illustrate this, suppose that the population model in any period t is the
following fully parametric version of the HSM:
Yt = α
′
tXt + ǫt, if Ht > 0, (8)
Ht = max{γ
′
tZt + ηt, 0}, (9)
where the first element of the vector Xt is the constant term, and ǫt and ηt are
distributed independently of Zt as bivariate normal with zero means, unit variances,
and correlation coefficient ρt.
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The counterfactual mean of Y for the selected population when the local average
structural function (LASF)11 is as in group t, FZ,V is as in group k, and the selection
rule is as in group r. Using the notation above, this has the form:
µsY〈t,k,r〉 =
∫
µt(x, v) 1{hr(z, v} > 0) dFZk,Vk(z, v)∫
1{hr(z, v) > 0} dFZk,Vk(z, v)
, (10)
where:
µt(x, v) = α
′
tx+ ρtΦ
−1(v)
denotes the LASF in group t. The observed mean of Yt for the selected population
10We present the selection rule in this censored form in order to employ our approach although
our discussion of the HSM which follows is based on the binary rule that only 1(Ht > 0) is observed.
11 The LASF µ(x, v) = E[g(x, ǫ) |V = v] gives the mean value of wage if all individuals with
control function equal to v had observable characteristics equal to x.
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(after integrating over the distribution of Zt) is:
µsY〈t,t,t〉 = α
′
t E[Xt |Ht > 0] + ρt E[λ(γ
′
tZt) |Ht > 0],
where λ(·) denotes the inverse Mills ratio. We decompose the difference µsY〈1,1,1〉 −
µsY〈0,0,0〉 between two time periods, t = 0 and t = 1, into selection, composition and
structural effects.
MR define the selection effect as:
ρ1 E[λ(γ
′
1Z1) |H1 > 0]− ρ0 E[λ(γ
′
0Z0) |H0 > 0].
This effect consists of the following three elements:
ρ1
∫
[λ(γ′1z)Φ1(γ
′
1z)− λ(γ
′
0z)Φ1(γ
′
0z)] dFZ1(z)+
+ ρ1
[∫
λ(γ′0z)Φ1(γ
′
0z) dFZ1(z)−
∫
λ(γ′0z)Φ0(γ
′
0z) dFZ0(z)
]
+
+ (ρ1 − ρ0)
′
E [λ (γ′0Z1)|H0 > 0] , (11)
where Φk(γ
′
rz) = Φ(γ
′
rz)/
∫
Φ(γ′rz) dFZk(z) is the counterfactual probability of selec-
tion in group k when the selection rule is as in group r and Φ(·) denotes the standard
normal DF. The first two elements in (11) capture the effect of changes over time
in the composition of the selected population in terms of observable characteristics.
The first element results from applying the selection rule from period 0 to period 1
holding the composition of period 1 fixed, whereas the second component results
from changing the distribution of characteristics from period 1 to period 0. The
third element captures the effect of changes over time in the composition of the
selected population in terms of unobservables through the correlation coefficient.12
In our view, the first and third elements rightfully belong to the selection effect,
whereas the second element belongs to the composition effect as it is driven by
changes over time in the distribution of Z.
We now present the selection, composition and structural effects for our decom-
12 MR make the strong assumption that the distribution of the covariates does not change over
time, i.e., FZ0 = FZ1 , so the second component drops out.
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position and compare them with the corresponding effects in MR. Plugging this
expression for the LASF µt(x, v) into (10) gives, after some straightforward calcu-
lations:
µsY〈t,k,r〉 =
∫
[α′tx+ ρtλ(γ
′
rz)] Φk(γ
′
rz) dFZk(z).
Thus, our selection effect is:
µsY〈1,1,1〉 − µ
s
Y〈1,1,0〉
= α′1
∫
x [Φ1(γ
′
1z)− Φ1(γ
′
0z)] dFZ1(z)+
+ ρ1
∫
[λ(γ′1z)Φ1(γ
′
1z)− λ(γ
′
0z)Φ1(γ
′
0z)] dFZ1(z). (12)
The first element on the right-hand-side of (12) is the effect on the average wage
of changes over time in the composition of the selected population in terms of ob-
servable characteristics resulting from applying the selection equation from period 0
to period 1. It is positive when the selected population contains relatively more
individuals with characteristics that are associated with higher average wages. This
element is missing in the selection effect in (11). The second element is the cor-
responding effect for the unobservable characteristics and corresponds to the first
element in (11).
Our composition effect is:
µsY〈1,1,0〉 − µ
s
Y〈1,0,0〉
= α′1
[∫
xΦ1(γ
′
0z) dFZ1(z)−
∫
xΦ0(γ
′
0z) dFZ0(z)
]
+
+ ρ1
[∫
λ(γ′0z)Φ1(γ
′
0z) dFZ1(z)−
∫
λ(γ′0z)Φ0(γ
′
0z) dFZ0(z)
]
. (13)
The first element on the right-hand-side of (13) is the change in the average wage
resulting directly from changes over time in the distribution of the observable char-
acteristics, while its second element is the same as the second element in (11).
Finally, our structural effect is:
µsY〈1,0,0〉 − µ
s
Y〈0,0,0〉
= (α1 − α0)
′
E [X0|H0 > 0] + (ρ1 − ρ0)E [λ (γ
′
0Z0)|H0 > 0] . (14)
The first element on the right-hand-side of (14) reflects the impact of changes over
time in the returns to observable characteristics, while the second element captures
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the type and degree of selection and is the same as the third element in (11). As
the expectation involving the inverse Mills ratio is positive, the contribution of this
element is positive whenever ρ1 > ρ0.
Finally, we illustrate with a simple example that the two elements of the struc-
tural effect cannot generally be identified when the model is nonseparable. Consider
a multiplicative version of the parametric HSM, which is obtained by replacing (8)
with
Yt = α
′
tXt ǫt, if Ht > 0,
and weakening the parametric assumption on the joint distribution of ǫt and ηt by
only requiring that ηt ∼ N(0, 1) and E[ǫt |Zt, Ht > 0] = ρtλ(γ
′
tZt). In this case αt
and ρt cannot be separately identified from the moment condition:
E[Yt |Zt, Ht > 0] = α
′
tXt ρtλ(γ
′
tZt).
While this discussion focuses on the decomposition of the mean wage, others have
also investigated the decomposition of the distribution of wages. Both AB and
MW derive selection effects at different points of the distribution. That is, they
employ the Machado and Mata (2005) method to simulate the wage distribution
that would result if everybody in the population worked based on estimates of
the model’s parameters obtained via the AB procedure. Thus in this example the
AB approach would provide selection free estimates of α for the sample for which
they are identified and then simulate wages using these estimates. Thus, similar to
MR, this approach ignores the structural and composition effects operating through
the selection effects. They interpret the difference between this distribution and
the uncorrected distribution of wages as a selection effect although some of this
difference reflects composition and structural effects. This differs from our approach
which investigates the counterfactual distribution for a more “restrictive selection
regime” than is observed but in which the selection effects are not contaminated
with components of the others. Note that the term “restrictive selection regime”
implies a setting in which the participation rate is lower.
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4 Empirical results
4.1 Hours equation
The left panel of Figure 3 plots the employment rates of males and females, defined
as the percentage of the sample reporting positive annual hours of work. The male
employment rate fluctuates cyclically around a downward trend starting at 90.0 per-
cent, falling to a minimum of 82.1 percent in 2012, and is 83.1 percent in 2016. The
female rate increases from a low of 56.5 percent in 1976 to a high of 75.3 percent in
2001, and falls to 70.0 percent in 2016. The right panel of Figure 3 plots average
annual hours of work for wage earners. For males they vary cyclically around a
slight upward trend, increasing from 2032 hours in 1976 to 2103 hours in 2016, after
reaching a maximum of 2160 hours in 2001. For females they increase rapidly from
1515 hours in 1976 to 1792 hours in 2000, then increase slowly to 1838 hours in
2016. These patterns suggest important movements along both the intensive and
extensive margins of labor supply.
An assumption of our model is that the number of annual hours of work is
continuously distributed for values above the observed minimum number of hours
worked for each year of our sample. To explore this, Figure 6 plots the DFs of annual
hours worked by those working positive annual hours, separately by gender, for the
survey years 1976, 1996 and 2016. These years are chosen to be illustrative. Our
aim is not to illustrate how the DF of hours has changed over our period, but rather
to illustrate the presence of both point masses and a continuous component in the
distribution of annual hours of work. For example, while there is a large jump in
the DF at 2080 annual hours, corresponding to the large fraction of workers working
exactly 40 hours per week for 52 weeks, we also observe a nonzero fraction of workers
at a large number of other values of annual hours of work. This indicates that the
control function also takes on a large number of values. As we do not make any
assumptions regarding the distribution of the unobservables in the hours equation,
the large spike at 2080 hours does not constitute a violation of our assumptions.
However, we acknowledge that it produces no variation in the control function at
this particular point, for given values of Z, and we explore the implications of this
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below.
As described in more detail in the Appendix, we estimate the control function,
defined as the conditional DF of annual hours, via a logistic distribution regression of
annual hours of work on the set of conditioning variables in Z, separately by gender
and survey year, including both workers and nonworkers. The conditioning variables
in Z include a quadratic term in age, a set of indicators for the highest educational
attainment reported, an indicator for not being married with spouse present, an
indicator for being nonwhite, a set of indicators for the region of residence, linear
terms in the number of household members and the number of children in the
household, and indicators for the presence in the household of children aged less
than 5 years and of unrelated individuals. We also include the interaction of the
quadratic age term with the educational indicators.
Except for the household size and composition variables, all the other condition-
ing variables appear in both the models for annual hours and hourly wages. Thus,
variation in household size and composition provides one source of identification,
as it induces variation in the control function for the sample of workers which is
distinct from that induced by variation in the conditioning variables also included
in the model for hourly wages. While one might argue that household size and
composition may affect hourly wage rates, we regard our exclusion restrictions as
reasonable and note that similar restrictions have been previously employed (see,
for example, MR). However, given the potentially contentious use of these exclusion
restrictions, we explore the impact of not using them below. Given the selection
rule, the assumption that annual hours of work do not affect the hourly wage rate
means that the variation in hours across individuals is the other source of identifi-
cation. As our focus is on the wage equation, we do not discuss the results for the
hours equation.
4.2 Decompositions
We now estimate gender-specific wage equations for each survey year by distribu-
tion regression over the subsample with positive hourly wages. The conditioning
variables include all those present in the equation for annual hours, with the excep-
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tion of the household size and composition variables. In addition, we include the
control function, its square, and interactions between the other conditioning vari-
ables and the control function. Decomposing the changes in the wage distribution
as shown in (7) requires a base year. The steadily increasing female participation
rate suggests that 1976 is a reasonable choice for females, as it has the lowest level
of participation over our period. One can then plausibly assume that those with a
certain combination of x and v working in 1976 also have a positive probability of
working in any other year, as required by the identification conditions outlined in
FVV. A sensible choice for males is 2010, the bottom of the Great Recession, as it
has the lowest level of participation over our sample period. The different base years
for males and females means that we can compare trends but not wage levels across
genders. Irrespective of the base year we present the changes relative to 1976.
The decompositions at the 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th, and 90th percentiles are shown
in Figures 7–11. They capture the impact of changes in the specified components.
For example, the selection effect reflects the contribution of a change in the selec-
tion process on the wage distribution. We commence with the median (Figure 9).
During our sample period, the median wage of males decreases by 13 percent while
that of females increases by 20 percent. The structural and the total effects are very
similar for males, with the small difference due to the composition effect. There is
no evidence of any change in the selection effects. The composition effect increases
the median wage by around 2 percent and most likely reflects the increasing educa-
tional attainment of the workforce. The structural component, which appears to be
strongly procylical, produces large negative effects. While there are some upturns,
coinciding with periods of economic expansion, the structural effect is negative for
the entire period. This negative structural effect is consistent with Chernozhukov
et al. (2013) who perform a similar exercise for the period 1979 to 1988 without
correcting for sample selection.
Figure 9 reveals that the increase in the female median wage is entirely driven
by the composition effect. The structural effect is negative for the whole period, but
less substantial than that for males. The contribution of the selection component is
negative but negligible. This contrasts with MR, who find that the selection effect
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changes from negative and large to positive and large. We do not find evidence of
such a drastic effect but, as highlighted above, our definition of the selection ef-
fect differs from that employed by MR and our approach includes the non-FTFY
workers. If their assertion that the correlation between ε and η increased over time
is correct, implying that the selected sample of females became increasingly more
productive relative to the total population, then our selection effect might under-
estimate the total change in the wage distribution due to changes in the selected
sample over time. We do not, however, find support for their conclusion that the
least productive females, in terms of unobservables, were working in the 1970s and
1980s. Our selection effect measures the difference between the observed wage dis-
tribution in any given year and the counterfactual distribution if the “least likely
to participate” females among the selected sample would not have participated. If
these females would also be the most productive, this would reduce the wage in
the “counterfactual” year and reflect a positive change in the selection effect in our
figures for the 1970s and the 1980s. We find no support for a positive change in the
selection effect.
The decompositions suggest the decline in the median male wage is due to the
prices associated with the male skill characteristics. As previous evidence highlights
the returns to higher levels of schooling have generally increased, and the male labor
force has become increasingly more educated, this suggests that the returns to those
individuals with the lowest levels of education has markedly decreased. A similar
pattern is observed for the female median wage although the less substantial negative
structural impact is offset by the composition effects.
Figures 7 and 8 report the decompositions at the 10th and 25th percentiles and
they are remarkably similar for males. They suggest that the reductions in the male
wage rate capture the prices associated with the human capital of individuals located
at these lower quantiles. There is evidence of a negative structural component of
around 25 to 30 percent at each of these quantiles in both the late 1990s and the
late 2010s. While these effects are somewhat offset by the composition effects, the
overall effect on wages is negative. There are no signs of selection effects for males.
Our results at the 10th percentile for the period 1979 to 1988 appear to differ from
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those in Chernozhukov et al. (2013). However, that study breaks the structural
effect into separate components due to changes in the mandatory minimum wage,
unionization, and the returns to any other characteristic. Not surprisingly, changes
in the mandatory minimum wage have a large impact on the 10th percentile. Our
estimate of the structural effect combines these various components and also includes
the variation in the prices of unobservables. Our results are consistent with their
study at all other percentiles.
The evidence at the 10th and 25th percentiles for females is very different to that
for males. First, there are greater differences between the 10th and 25th percentiles.
The negative structural effects for females are more evident at the 10th percentile.
The structural effects are small at the 25th percentile and offset by the composition
effects. For both the 10th and 25th percentiles the overall wage changes become
positive in the late 1990s and generally increase over the remainder of the sample.
Figures 10 and 11 present the decompositions at the 75th and 90th percentiles.
At the 75th percentile, the male wage shows a small increase. The structural com-
ponent displays a similar pattern to that for females at the lower quantiles discussed
above. That is, initially there is a large decrease before rebounding and remain-
ing relatively flat from the early 2000s. The negative changes resulting from the
structural component are not sufficiently large to dominate the positive composi-
tion effects so the overall wage growth at the 75th percentile is positive from the
early 2000s onwards.
The changes in the female hourly wage rate at the 75th percentile highlight that
the larger movements have occurred at the upper percentiles of the wage distribu-
tion. The changes in the structural component are initially negative before turning
positive around the mid 1980s. From the beginning of the 1980s the positively
trending structural component combines with the composition effect to produce a
steadily increasing wage. However, while the decomposition at the 75th percentile
suggests that the structural components are an important contribution to inequality
at higher quantiles of the distribution, the results at the 90th percentile are even
more supportive of this perspective. For males the structural component is less
negative than at lower quantiles and this, combined with the positive composition
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effect, produces a wage gain for the whole period. For females the structural com-
ponent is positive from the middle of the 1980s and has a larger positive effect than
the composition effect. The two effects combine to produce a remarkable 41 percent
growth in the wage.
Figures 9–11 suggest that selection effects cannot explain the observed changes
in the males’ wage distribution. At the 50th, 75th and the 90th percentiles the
selection effect is essentially zero. This is not surprising as males in this area of the
wage distribution have a strong commitment to the labor force. Moreover, there is
likely to be relatively little movement on either the extensive or intensive margin
given males’ level of commitment to full-time employment. One might suspect that
it would be more likely to uncover changes in the selection effects at the lower parts
of the wage distribution as these individuals are likely to have a weaker commitment
to full-time employment or their level of employment may be reduced via spells of
unemployment. However, the evidence does not support this.
For females, there is little evidence of changes in selection at the higher quantiles.
Females located in this part of the wage distribution are likely to have had a relatively
strong commitment to employment in 1976 and thus there were no substantial moves
in their hours distribution. Moreover, these individuals are less likely to incur periods
of unemployment. However, at the 10th and 25th percentiles the selection effects
seem economically important.13 At the 10th percentile in 2016 the selection effect
contribution is 2.2 percent, while the total wage change is between 8 and 9 percent.
Thus the female wage was lowered by 2 percent due to the increased participation
of females. This is consistent with the finding by MR of “positive selection” for
the 1990s. We also find a similar relationship for the late 1970s and 1980s. Our
results generally suggest a positive relationship between the control variable V and
wages at the bottom of the distribution. This implies that those with the highest
number of working hours, after conditioning on their observable characteristics, had
the highest wages. The trends implied by our results suggest that selection becomes
more important as we move further down the female wage distribution. This is
similar to the findings of AB which studies the evolution of female wages in the
13 The confidence intervals for these selection effects are presented in Figure 12. They indicate
that for several time periods selection effects are statistically significantly different from zero.
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British labor market for the period 1978 to 2000.
5 Discussion
We now discuss four important issues, namely, the validity of our exclusion restric-
tions, the composition of our wage sample, the exclusion of hours from the wage
equation, and the discreteness of annual hours of work.14
We noted above that the use of household composition variables as exclusion
restrictions can be seen as controversial in this setting for both males and females.
We highlight that these are the same exclusion restrictions which are employed in
the MR and MW papers. However, to provide further insight on the impact of these
exclusion restrictions we reproduced the decompositions when we first excluded the
household variables from both the hours and wage equations and then included
them in both equations. For each of these two new specifications the model is now
identified by the variation in the number of hours worked. We do not find any
remarkable changes from either model, in comparison to the specification employed
above, with respect to the presence or magnitude of selection effects. The only
notable difference is the presence of occasionally larger negative selection effects
at the bottom decile for females for the specification which excludes the family
composition variables from both equations.
Now consider the issues related to the composition of our wage sample. As
we construct our control function using the hours of annual work variable we are
imposing, for example, that an individual who works 2 hours a week for 50 weeks
of the year is the same, in terms of unobservables, as an identical individual who
works 50 hours a week for only 2 weeks. Given the interpretation of the control
function this may be unreasonable. We check for the sensitivity of our results to
this assumption by censoring the data at various points of the hours distribution.
Our empirical work above employs wages for all those working positive hours so
we reproduce the decomposition exercises after censoring the data at the 5th, 10th,
14 The discussion that follows is based on reproducing our empirical work while incorporating
the issue under focus. Tables or graphs with the results are not included but are available from
the authors.
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and 25th percentiles of the hours distribution. That is, we exclude the individuals
working lower numbers of hours from our wage sample while retaining them in the
estimation of the hours equation. We also repeat the decomposition exercise using
the full time full year selection rule employed by MR. The increased censoring has
the impact of making the wage sample more homogenous. Note, however, that as
this exercise is changing the sample size of the wage sample it is not reasonable to
compare results at the same quantiles across samples. However, with the exception
of the structural effects for females at the upper quartile the results for the structural,
composition and total effects at different quantiles are very similar for the different
censoring rules and the FTFY samples. The only notable difference is the absence
of the selection effects except for the larger samples. That is, once we censor the
bottom of the hours distribution the selection effects even disappear at the lower
quantiles for females. This is consistent with our earlier discussion that the selection
effects capture the impact of the inclusion of those with a weaker commitment to
market employment. We highlight that we find no evidence of a change in selection
effects using the FTFY sample corresponding to the MR selection rule. However,
as we discussed in detail above, this reflects the different definitions of selection
effects and the inability to disentangle components of their selection effect from the
structural effect in our setting.
In addition to employing these different censoring rules based on annual hours,
we reproduce all of our empirical analysis using weekly hours rather than annual
hours. This eliminates the variation due to differences in weeks worked and avoids
the issue discussed above of treating different types of individuals, in terms of the
unobservables, as the same. We do not find any differences for the decomposition
exercises using the corresponding control functions from the two different hours
variables. This is reassuring as it suggests we are not introducing some type of
misspecification error by incorrectly treating individuals who arrive at the same
number of annual hours by different combinations of weeks and weekly hours as the
same.
Next consider the exclusion of annual hours from the hourly wage equation.
While it is not typical to include annual hours in hourly wage equations, there may
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be reasons to expect that the number of hours worked per year matter. Despite
an early literature (see for example Barzel, 1973) on how labor productivity may
vary with hours, and some evidence of overtime premia and part-time penalties,
there has been a general lack of attention to how hourly wages vary with hours.
Most investigations focus on full-time workers ignoring the large variation in annual
hours within this category of workers. To address this issue we re-estimate the model
including annual hours as a conditioning variable and noting that the inclusion of
the control function accounts for the endogeneity of hours in addition to the selection
issues. We explore various specifications allowing hours to enter the wage model in
a variety of ways. We then evaluated the impact of various levels of annual hours
on wages. More precisely, we evaluate the effect on hourly wages of working 500,
1000, 1500 and 2000 hours per year. For males, we found that there was a highly
variable and non monotonic relationship across years. However the relationship
fluctuated wildly and there was no clear relationship. Moreover, for many years
there was no evidence of an hours effect. This evidence supports the exclusion of
hours from the wage equation in that the variability suggests an imprecise estimate
of the hours effect. For females the evidence is not as clear. The estimated premium
from working full time appears too large to be consistent with the raw data, and
there is a large increase in hourly wages from going from 1500 annual hours to 2000
annual hours. This also appears to be inconsistent with the raw data. In addition, as
with males, the estimates display big jumps (both upwards and downwards) across
years. We conclude that these effects may reflect collinearity between the control
function and the hours variable or the impact of our exclusion restrictions. Thus we
conclude that there is no strong evidence to support the inclusion of hours in the
female wage equation. Note that it is not clear what the implications for our results
of incorrectly omitting annual hours from the wage equation would be. It is possible
that the hours effect might be inappropriately attributed to the selection effect due
to the correlation between hours and the control function. However, the absence of
selection effects suggests that if the results are affected, then it is only at the lower
quantiles unless the exclusion of hours is masking the selection effects.
Finally consider the discreteness of annual hours. Figure 6 reveals a large jump
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in the distribution function at 2080 hours for both males and females, reflecting
the large number of individuals who report working exactly 40 hours per week for
52 weeks. This and other mass points in the distribution of annual hours imply
corresponding mass points in the distribution of the control function suggesting
that it is inconsistent with being distributed uniformly. In fact, these mass points
may reflect “rounding up” by the respondents. In this case, the underlying control
function is still uniform but the estimated control function is not. One way to
investigate this is to draw from a uniform distribution between the mass points of
the estimated control function or alternatively, adding an arbitrarily small amount
of noise to the observed hours. Both methods result in exactly the same simulated
control function. With this new control function we reproduced the empirical work.
For each of the empirical exercises the introduction of the noise had no notable
consequences.
6 Extensions
We now present some extensions of the decomposition exercises presented in Sec-
tion 4.2.
6.1 Educational premia
Our results show that the structural effects are often the main source of changes
in the distribution of wages. Since substantial empirical evidence documents the
importance of education in the increasing wage dispersion (see, for example, Autor
et al. 2008, and Murphy and Topel 2016), we try to isolate the specific role of
education treating, as customary in this literature, an individual’s education level
as exogenous. Hence, we do not attempt to distinguish between whether the returns
to education have increased or whether the returns to unobserved characteristics
positively correlated with education have increased.
We represent education by three indicators for the highest education level at-
tained, namely “high school graduate,” “some college,” and “college or more”. The
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excluded category is “high school dropout”.15 The educational attainment of the
workforce increased dramatically over our sample period. The fraction of male work-
ers with at most a high-school degree fell from 64.1 percent in 1976 to 38.4 percent in
2016, while the fraction of those with at least a college degree rose from 20.4 percent
in 1976 to 35.2 percent in 2016. The trends for females are even more striking, as
the fraction of those with at most a high-school degree fell from 69.1 percent in 1976
to 29.7 percent in 2016, while the fraction of those with at least a college degree
rose from 16.1 percent in 1976 to 40.1 percent in 2016.
We estimate the average treatment effect (ATE) of education under the as-
sumption that the data available in each survey year represent a sample of size
n, {(Hi, Yi, Zi)}
n
i=1, from the distribution of the random vector (H, Y, Z), where Yi
is only observed when Hi > 0 and Zi contains all the variables in Xi.
16 Under
this assumption, the average effect of changing the education level from e0 to e is
estimated as:
1
ne
n∑
i=1
1{Ei = e} µ̂(X
∗
i , e, V̂i)−
1
ne0
n∑
i=1
1{Ei = e0} µ̂(X
∗
i , e0, V̂i),
where Ei is education level of individual i, X
∗
i consists of the other conditioning
variables inXi, ne and ne0 are the number of individuals with education level equal to
e and e0 respectively, and V̂i denotes the estimated control function for individual i.
The function µ̂ is the estimated LASF based on a flexibly specified OLS regression of
log wages on X∗i , Ei, and Vi. As we use log wages these effects can all be interpreted
as percentage changes. To satisfy identification restrictions outlined by FVV, we
calculate the wage increase that workers with education level e0 would expect to
receive if they achieved a higher level of education e.
The patterns of the ATEs over the period 1976–2016 are similar for males and
females.17 The ATE for the “high school graduate” versus “high school dropout”
15 Since 1992, the CPS measures educational attainment by the highest year of school or degree
completed rather than the previously employed highest year of school attendance. Although the
educational recode by the IPUM-CPS aims at maximizing comparability over time, there is a
discontinuity between 1991 and 1992 in how those with a high school degree and some college are
classified.
16 For simplicity we suppress the time subscript.
17 The results are available from the authors.
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contrast increases from about 25 percent at the beginning of the period to around
30 percent at the end, after peaking at around 35 percent in the late 1990s. The ATE
for the “some college” to “high school dropout” contrast starts at about 35 percent,
the same as the peak level for the high school premium, and reaches about 45 percent
at the end of the period after increasing to about 50 percent in the late 1990s. Even
with the small decline in the last 10 years, the overall increase over the period is
substantial. The ATE for the “college or more” to “high school dropout” contrast is
sizable and despite a small decline in the late 1970s (which is stronger for females), it
increases sharply between 1976 and 2016, from about 50 percent for males and about
70 percent for females to about 90 percent for both genders. We also examine the
variation in the these respective effects by estimating the quantile treatment effects
for each of these educational contrasts. Although we do not report the results we
refer to the major findings below.
These results confirm the findings from the existing literature, dating back to
Murphy and Welch (1992), that the education premia have increased remarkably
since the early 1980s. The slowest increase is for the high-school premium, especially
at the lower percentiles, while the fastest is for the college premium, especially at
the upper percentiles. These increases are neither uniform across the distribution of
wages, as they differ across percentiles, nor uniform over time, as they are mostly
concentrated during the 1980s and 1990s. Our results show that the high-school
premium tends to present an inverted U-shaped pattern, especially at the lower
percentiles, while the college premium tends to increase monotonically throughout
the period, though at a slower rate after the 1990s, especially at the lower percentiles.
As a consequence, during the 1980s and 1990s, both the high-school and the college
premia rise, especially at the higher percentiles, but the college premium increases
faster. After the 1990s, the college premium continues rising, though at a slower
rate, but the high school premium tends to fall, especially at the lower percentiles.
As both the levels and the trends of the education premia are remarkably similar
for males and females, this evidence suggests that the returns to education are not
the only contributing factors to the patterns of between-gender wage inequality.
While we do not attempt to isolate here the role of other conditioning variables,
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they are included in the decomposition exercises presented in Section 4.2. These
decompositions reveal that the mechanisms driving wages differ both by gender and
location in the wage distribution. For males, the fall in wages at the median or
below largely reflects the increasing penalty associated with lower education and
other forces that negatively affect the lower skilled, as revealed by the large neg-
ative structural effects for this area of the wage distribution. With the general
trend towards rising educational attainments, the composition effects are positive
and partly offset the negative structural effects. However, the large and increasing
educational premium signals that the “penalty” associated with lower education has
increased. The negative structural effects for males are not restricted to the lower
part of the wage distribution. For females, there are wage increases at each quantile
we examined and these reflect, in part, positive and increasing composition effects.
Moreover, while the structural effects are generally negative for the whole period
at the 10th and 25th percentiles, they are typically positive at the quantiles we
examined above the median. Most notably, the structural effects for females are
not dampening wage growth to the same extent as for males and at some quantiles
these structural effects are even substantial contributors to wage growth. At the
lower parts of the female wage distribution the impact of selection is negative and
can be substantial. Selection effects become more important as we move down the
wage distribution. The patterns at the 10th and 25th percentiles are suggestive of
possible larger selection effects at lower percentiles.
Our investigation does not provide direct insight into the macro factors gener-
ating these wage profiles. Nor does it provide evidence on the role of particular
institutional factors which may influence certain segments of the workforce. How-
ever it does seem that the mechanisms affecting the wages at the bottom are very
different than those influencing the top. At the top the evidence is supportive of
an increasing skill premium. At the bottom it appears that the prevailing con-
siderations are those associated with decreasing protection of lower wage workers.
These include the decrease in the real value of the minimum wage, the reduction
in unionization and the union premium, and the increase in employer bargaining
power.
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6.2 Wage Inequality
We now examine the issue of wage inequality, which rose dramatically as measured
by increases in the 90/10 interdecile ratio of 55 percent for males and 38 percent
for females. Although our evidence shows that changes in hourly wages at different
points in the distribution are affected differently by the relevant factors, we are
unable to directly infer the respective contribution of these factors to the changes in
inequality. The left panel of Figure 13 provides a decomposition of the changes in
the decile ratio for males. Recall that wage changes at the 10th percentile are due
to the large negative structural effects, with no evidence of selection effects and a
small positive composition effect at least up to the early 1990s. On the other hand,
the large gains at the 90th percentile reflect steadily increasing composition and
structural effects, with no signs of changes in selection effects. Thus, unsurprisingly,
the large increase in the decile ratio for males is mostly due to the structural effects.
The composition effects are much smaller but also tend to increase inequality, mainly
through their large positive contribution at the upper tail of the distribution.
For females the evidence is harder to interpret. There is an increasingly positive
composition effect at the first decile but the negative structural effect produces a
decline in wages. At the upper decile, there is a steadily increasing composition effect
and a structural effect which is generally increasing wages. The large increase in the
total effect for the majority of the sample period reflects the sum of these two positive
effects. At the lower decile, the evidence suggests that the changes in the selection
effects are negatively affecting wage growth, while there is no sign of selection at
the upper decile. The right panel of Figure 13 presents the decomposition of the
changes in the decile ratio for females. In the light of our previous remarks, it is not
surprising that these changes mostly reflect the structural effect. The composition
effect is negative but small, and largely acts through the lower part of the wage
distribution. The selection effect is positive and, in some periods, it contributes
a relatively large fraction of the total change. This result is consistent with MR
although it appears that our results primarily reflect the impact of selection on the
bottom of the female wage distribution.
Although our primary focus is not on gender inequality, we examine the trends in
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the male/female ratio at different points of the wage distribution. Figure 14 reveals
several interesting findings. First, at all points of the wage distribution, females
appear to be catching up, with the greatest gains at the median or below. This
result should be treated with caution as it largely reflects a reduction in the male
wage, not an increase in the female wage. Second, the improvement in the relative
position of females is almost entirely due to structural effects. As our previous
evidence suggests that the sign and size of the structural effects varies both over
time and by location in the wage distribution, it is surprising that the impact on
the gender wage ratios is so clear. Third, the composition effects also have steadily
increased the relative performance of females at all quantiles, though the size of the
effect diminishes as we move up the wage distribution and is smallest at the upper
decile. Finally, the selection effects are increasing gender inequality, though they
only appear to play a role in the lower part of the wage distribution.
7 Conclusions
This paper documents the changes in female and male wages over the period 1976
to 2016. We decompose these changes into structural, composition and selection
components by estimating a nonseparable model with selection. We find that male
real wages at the median and below have decreased despite an increasing skill pre-
mium and an increase in educational attainment. The reduction is primarily due to
large decreases of the wages of the individuals with lower levels of education. Wages
at the upper quantiles of the distribution have increased drastically due to a large
and increasing skill premium and this has, combined with the decreases at the lower
quantiles, substantially increased wage inequality. Female wage growth at lower
quantiles is modest although the median wage has grown steadily. The increases at
the upper quantiles for females are substantial and reflect increasing skill premia.
These changes have resulted in a substantial increase in female wage inequality. As
our sample period is associated with large changes in the participation rates and
the hours of work of females we explore the role of changes in “selection” in wage
movements. We find that the impact of these changes in selection is to decrease the
wage growth of those at the lower quantiles with very little evidence of selection ef-
30
fects at other locations in the female wage distribution. The selection effects appear
to increase wage inequality.
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Figure 4: Fraction of wage earners working full-time (FT), full-year (FY), and full-
time full-year (FTFY)
37
1980 1990 2000 2010
0
20
40
60
Survey year
H
ou
rl
y
w
ag
es
Non FTFY
1980 1990 2000 2010
Survey year
FTFY
1980 1990 2000 2010
0
20
40
60
Survey year
H
ou
rl
y
w
ag
es
Non FTFY
1980 1990 2000 2010
Survey year
FTFY
P5 P10 P25 P50 P75 P90
Males
Females
Figure 5: Percentiles of real hourly wages
38
0 1000 2000 3000 4000
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Annual hours
Males
0 1000 2000 3000 4000
Annual hours
Females
1976 1996 2016
Figure 6: Distribution functions of positive annual hours of work
1980 1990 2000 2010
−0.4
−0.2
0
0.2
0.4
Survey year
D
iff
er
en
ce
Males
1980 1990 2000 2010
Survey year
Females
Selection Structural Composition Total
Figure 7: Decompositions at the 10th percentile
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Figure 8: Decompositions at the 25th percentile.
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Figure 9: Decompositions at the 50th percentile
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Figure 10: Decompositions at the 75th percentile
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Figure 11: Decompositions at 90th percentile
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Figure 12: Selection components and associated 95% confidence intervals for females
at various percentiles
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Figure 13: Decompositions of the decile ratio
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Figure 14: Decomposition of the changes in the ratio of male to female wages
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Appendix: Estimation and inference
We follow FVV and employ a multistep semiparametric method based on distribu-
tion regression to estimate the global objects of interest, namely the counterfactual
DF GsY〈t,k,r〉(y), the counterfactual QF q
s
Y〈t,k,r〉
(τ), and the ATE of education. The
reduced-form specifications used in each step can be motivated by parametric re-
strictions on model (1)–(2). We refer to Chernozhukov et al. (2019) for examples of
such restrictions. For each group, we assume a sample of size n, {(Hi, Yi ∗ 1{Hi >
0}, Zi)}
n
i=1, from the distribution of the random vector (H, Y ∗1{H > 0}, Z), where
Y ∗ 1{H > 0} indicates that Y is observable only when H > 0.
In the first step we estimate the control function for each group using logistic
distribution regression (Foresi and Peracchi 1995, and Chernozhukov et al. 2013).
More precisely, for every observation in the selected sample with Hi > 0, we set:
V̂i = Λ(R
′
iπ̂(Hi)), Ri = r(Zi), i = 1, . . . , n,
where Λ(u) = (1+e−u)−1 is the standard logistic DF, r(z) is a dr-dimensional vector
of transformations of z with good approximating properties (such as polynomials,
B-splines, or interactions), and:
π̂(h) = arg max
pi∈Rdr
n∑
i=1
[1{0 < Hi ≤ h} log Λ(R
′
iπ)) + 1{Hi > h} log Λ(−R
′
iπ)] ,
for h in the empirical support Hn of H .
In the second step we estimate the LASF µ(x, v) and the LDSF G(y, x, v) for
each group using flexibly parametrized ordinary least squares (OLS) and distribu-
tion regressions, where the unknown control function is replaced by its estimator
V̂i from the previous step. For reasons explained in FVV, we estimate over a sam-
ple trimmed with respect to the censoring variable H . We employ the following
trimming indicator among the selected sample:
T = 1{0 < H ≤ h}
for some h ∈ (0,∞) such that P(T = 1) > 0. The estimator of the LASF is
µ̂(x, v) = w(x, v)′β̂, where w(x, v) is a dw-dimensional vector of transformations of
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(x, v) with good approximating properties, and β̂ is the OLS estimator:
β̂ =
[
n∑
i=1
Ti ŴiŴ
′
i
]−1 n∑
i=1
Ti ŴiYi,
where Ŵi = w(Xi, V̂i). The estimator of the LDSF is Ĝ(y, x, v) = Λ(w(x, v)
′β̂(y)),
where y ∈ R and β̂(y) is the logistic distribution regression estimator:
β̂(y) = arg max
b∈Rdw
n∑
i=1
Ti
[
1{Yi ≤ y} logΛ(Ŵ
′
ib)) + 1{Yi > y} logΛ(−Ŵ
′
i b))
]
.
Finally, in the third step we use (5) to estimate the counterfactual DF (4) by:
ĜsY〈t,k,r〉(y) =
1
nskr
n∑
i=1
Λ(Ŵ ′i β̂t(y)) 1{V̂i > Λ(R
′
iπ̂r(0))},
where the average is taken over the sample values of V̂i and Zi in group k, n
s
kr =∑n
i=1 1{V̂i > Λ(R
′
iπ̂r(0))}, β̂t(y) is the logistic distribution regression estimator for
group t from the second step, and π̂r(0) is the distribution regression estimator for
group r from the first step. Given ĜsY〈t,k,r〉(y), we estimate the counterfactual QF
(6) by:
q̂sY〈t,k,r〉(τ) = inf{y ∈ R : Ĝ
s
Y〈t,k,r〉
(y) ≥ τ}, 0 < τ < 1.
Following FVV, inference is based on the weighted bootstrap (Praestgaard and
Wellner 1993). This method obtains the bootstrap version of the estimator of inter-
est by repeating all the estimation steps including sampling weights drawn from a
nonnegative distribution.
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